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Abstract. The so-called ‘argument from religious experience’ plays a prominent 
role in today’s analytical philosophy of religion. It is also of considerable 
importance to richard Swinburne’s apologetic project. However, rather than 
joining the polyphonic debate around this argument, the present paper examines 
the fundamental concept of religious experience. The upshot is that Swinburne 
neither develops a convincing concept of experience nor explains what makes 
a  religious experience religious. The first section examines some problems 
resulting mainly from terminology, specifically Swinburne’s use of appear-words 
as success-verbs. While these problems might be resolved by a recurrence to the 
observer, the second and third part of our paper present problems not so easily 
resolved: namely, that Swinburne’s concept of experience as conscious mental 
events is too broad and inaccurate for its role in the argument given (Section 2); 
and that Swinburne does not even attempt to figure out which features of 
an  experience, when present, turn an  experience simpliciter into a  distinctly 
religious experience (Section 3). Section 4, in conclusion, outlines possible 
reasons for this unusual and remarkable inaccuracy in conceptualisation.
‘The term “experience” (taken as either a noun or a verb) 
is notoriously slippery.’ 
Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief
The so-called argument from religious experience plays a  prominent 
role in today’s analytically coined philosophy of religion.1 Therefore, it 
1 many thanks to Winfried löffler, oliver Wiertz and Thomas m. Schmidt for valuable 
hints and discussions. – A German version of this paper was published in: Heinrich, e. 
/ Schönecker, D. (Hrsg.), Wirklichkeit und Wahrnehmung des Heiligen, Schönen, Guten – 
Neue Beiträge zur Realismusdebatte (Paderborn: mentis, 2011), pp. 125-146.
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is not surprising that this argument is also of considerable importance 
to richard Swinburne’s almost canonical work The Existence of God;2 as 
a matter of fact, he says so explicitly, writing that the argument is ‘of most 
importance for the purpose of this book [i.e. to The Existence of God]’ 
(p. 296).3 It is of central importance because once it is shown that the 
probability of theism given evidence other than religious experience is 
not very low,4 the ‘testimony of many witnesses to experiences apparently 
of God suffices to make many of those experiences probably veridical’; 
thus the evidence of religious experience is a ‘crucial piece of evidence’ 
(p. 341).
even so, there seem to be great discrepancies between the two (or 
three) editions of The Existence of God. While in the first edition (1979) 
Swinburne requires only that the probability of the existence of God 
given the classical arguments of natural theology should not be very low 
in order for the whole argument of religious experience to succeed, in the 
second edition (2004) he seems to believe not only that the probability 
should not be very low, but that it should be relatively high (something 
around 0.5).5 This is not the place to trace the development of Swinburne’s 
work, however. For this essay, it is sufficient to assess the work only to the 
extent that we can point out that the argument from religious experience 
is of central importance to Swinburne’s overall argumentation.
Thus, the general purpose of our paper is not an  analysis of this 
argument; neither its concrete implementation nor its specific role in the 
cumulative overall argument is of interest to us. rather, our aim is to 
provide an analysis of the very concept that is indispensable to and that 
is indeed the kernel of the argument from religious experience, to wit, 
2 The ‘argument from religious experience’ also plays a role, albeit only a minor one, 
in the likewise eminent work of Alvin Plantinga, especially in his Warranted Christian 
Belief. Its demoted importance in Plantinga’s work is expected, however, since it is the 
quintessence of reformed epistemology and the core of Plantinga’s concept of ‘warrant’ 
that belief in God does not need any arguments and also does not need any argument 
based on experience in particular). Furthermore, Plantinga’s properly basic beliefs about 
God are formed independently from religious experience.
3 Page numbers in brackets refer to richard Swinburne’s The Existence of God, Second 
edition (oxford: oxford university Press, 2004).
4 Swinburne discusses the arguments in this order: The Cosmological Argument, 
Teleological Arguments, Arguments from Consciousness and morality, The Argument 
for Providence, The Problem of evil, Arguments from History and miracles – and then 
The Argument from religious experience.
5 We are confining our analysis to the edition of 2004. See also löffler 2011.
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the concept of religious experience. The reason is simple: Whatever the 
merits of the argument from religious experience are or could be, one 
would think that it can only work if it is based on a clear cut concept 
of religious experience; after all, that is what the argument is about. It 
is therefore of major concern for Swinburne’s argumentation that he 
provide a convincing concept of ‘religious experience’. Furthermore, it is 
remarkable that despite its significance for Swinburne’s argumentation, 
until now there has been no detailed analysis of Swinburne’s concept of 
religious experience; discussion has revolved entirely around evaluations 
of the argument itself. Thus, an  analysis of Swinburne’s concept of 
religious experience is, as far as we can tell, a desideratum.6
After some preliminary remarks, Swinburne begins his chapter on 
the argument from religious experience with a section on ‘The nature of 
religious experience’ (pp. 293-298); the next section is about ‘Five kinds 
of religious experience’ (pp. 298-303). After a little more than two and 
a half pages, Swinburne writes: ‘So much for what an “experience” is and 
the ways in which we can describe it; but what constitutes a “religious 
experience”?’ (p.  295). Thus there are two basic questions: What is 
an experience, and what is a religious experience?
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Swinburne provides 
an unsatisfactory answer to both of these questions. roughly speaking, 
we see three problems with Swinburne’s concept of religious experience: 
(1) The first has to do with a distinction between what Swinburne calls 
‘internal’ and ‘external’ descriptions of one’s experiences and, based on 
this, a distinction between the ‘epistemic’ and ‘comparative’ use of so-
called ‘appear words’; this first, mainly terminological problem, although 
it takes some time to describe, can rather easily be resolved. The second 
and third problems are much more important and severe: Swinburne 
does not really explain what makes an  experience an  experience (2); 
because of this, but not only because this, he fails, thirdly (3), to explain 
what makes a  religious experience religious. We will structure our 
analysis in this order.
6 Franks Davis only mentions Swinburne’s concept of religious experience marginally 
(1989: 22 f.), though Swinburne plays a  major role to her work. She also nearly 
completely misses the particularities and problems we discuss here. Kwan, in his work 
The Argument from Religious Experience (2009), gives an overview of the current debate 
on the argument of religious experience. He, too, concentrates in his reproduction of 
Swinburne’s variant of the argument on the argument itself and says little on Swinburne’s 
concept of religious experience.
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I. THe FIrST Problem: ‘INTerNAl’ AND ‘eXTerNAl’ 
DeSCrIPTIoNS oF oNe’S eXPerIeNCeS
on the face of it, Swinburne’s analysis has the following structure: 
He starts with a  very broad definition of ‘experience’ as ‘a  conscious 
mental event’ (p. 293). He then distinguishes between an external and 
an internal description of an experience: the former, if true, entails that 
the object that is experienced really exists, whereas the latter, internal 
description, if true, does not entail this. Swinburne’s claim then is that 
‘all arguments from religious experience must be phrased as arguments 
from experience given internal descriptions’ (p. 294). The vocabulary of 
such an internal description, Swinburne argues next, consists in terms 
such as ‘appear’ or ‘seem’ as well as in perception verbs such as ‘look’, 
‘feel’, or ‘taste’. All these terms, says Swinburne (following Chisholm), 
can have an  ‘epistemic’ as well as a  ‘comparative’ use; consequently, 
one expects an internal description of a religious experience to include 
an epistemic or comparative use of the language. In what follows, we will 
discuss Swinburne’s model in more detail.7
According to Swinburne, religious experience is defined ‘as 
an experience that seems (epistemically) to the subject to be an experience 
of God’ (p. 295).8 obviously, this definition makes use of a rather obscure 
terminology, thus needing further explanation – for what does it mean 
that a religious experience is an experience that ‘seems (epistemically) 
to the subject to be an  experience of God’? To clarify this definition, 
we first have to turn to Swinburne’s distinction between internal and 
external descriptions. later we will see that this is where a problem for 
the definition arises.
In the following passage, Swinburne introduces his understanding of 
the distinction between internal and external descriptions:
An experience may be described in such a way as to entail the existence of 
some particular external thing apart from the subject, beyond the stream 
of his consciousness, normally the thing of which it is an experience; or 
7 It is remarkable that Swinburne only spends two pages of his analysis on the 
nature of experience and perception. Already at this stage, we may note critically that 
a cumulative argumentation, whose success depends substantially on the argument from 
religious experience, probably would have made it worth spending more than two pages 
on analysing the nature of experience and perception.
8 This quote has been shortened to fit our preliminary purposes; we will return to the 
complete definition later.
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it may be described in such a way as to carry no such entailment. Thus 
‘hearing the coach outside the window’ is not unnaturally described as 
an experience; but if I have such an experience, if I  really do hear the 
couch outside the window, then it follows that there is a coach outside 
the window. Yet, if I  describe my experience as ‘having an  auditory 
sensation that seemed to come from a coach outside the window’, my 
description does not entail the existence of anything external of which 
the experience was purportedly an experience (or anything else external). 
The former kind of description I  will call an  external description; the 
latter an internal description. (pp. 293 f.)
It is obvious that, with his talk of ‘external description’, Swinburne refers 
to the basic idea of realism in the philosophy of perception; namely, 
that one can only perceive (or experience) what is really there; thus (to 
reproduce an  example by Swinburne), one cannot and does not hear 
a  coach outside the window if there is no coach outside the window. 
In other words, Swinburne obviously believes that within an  external 
description ‘perceiving’ is a  success verb, i.e. a  verb describing an  act 
of perception (such as smelling, seeing, etc.), which implies that what 
one perceives is really there in order to be perceivable. This idea (which 
goes back to Gilbert ryle) – that perception verbs are success verbs – is 
essentially a semantic idea. It states that appear words are used in such 
a way that they imply the existence of the object that is claimed to be 
perceived. Whoever claims to have heard a coach outside the window 
also claims that there is a  coach outside the window. Should it turn 
out that there is no coach outside the window, then this person will 
no longer claim – or is no longer allowed to claim – that she has heard 
a coach outside the window; in fact, she has not heard a coach (maybe 
she hasn’t heard anything or heard something else). exactly in this sense, 
Swinburne writes that ‘if I really do hear the coach outside the window, 
then it follows that there is a coach outside the window’ (p. 294, emphasis 
added), whereas an  internal description ‘does not entail the existence 
of anything external’ (p.  294, emphasis added). We will see later that, 
indeed, this kind of perceptual realism is one of Swinburne’s crucial 
assumptions,9 and that it is, among other things, the very assumption 
that leads to a misleading presentation.
9 Considering the burden of proof, which religious perception has to take for the real 
existence of its object according to Swinburne’s theory, it is of no surprise that he makes 
use of such a realistic concept.
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Swinburne distinguishes explicitly between an  experience and the 
way that experience is described; after all, it is not an external or internal 
experience, but an external or internal description of that experience that 
shall play the role of a premiss in an argument from religious experience. 
According to Swinburne,
(1) I hear a coach outside the window.
is an external description, whereas
(2) I  have an  auditory sensation that seems to come from a  coach 
outside the window.
is an  internal description. Again, on the assumption that ‘hearing’ is 
a success-verb, (1) can only be true if there is a coach outside the window 
that is making the sounds that I  hear. on the other hand, (2) can be 
true even if there is no coach outside the window; I  might very well 
have an  auditory sensation that seems to come from a  coach outside 
the window though there is no coach outside the window. Thus, (2) is 
true simply if I do have an auditory sensation that seems to come from 
a  coach outside the window; for (2) to be true, I  just need to report 
my experience correctly (and thus must not lie, for instance). Hence 
the truth conditions for (1) are more stringent than those for (2). For 
example, if a woman says she has an auditory sensation that seems to her 
to come from a coach outside the window, all I need to assume in order 
to believe that claim is that this person is truthful. Assuming perceptual 
realism, one can question whether she really heard a coach outside the 
window without having to question whether she believes that she hears 
such a coach; one does not have to doubt her truthfulness in order to 
doubt the existence of the coach.10
Swinburne does not make such painstaking terminological 
clarifications as we do here, but these clarifications are well suited to his 
more general remarks on perception. The following quote, consisting 
of such general remarks, amounts to Swinburne’s endorsement of 
perceptual realism:
It seems to me, for reasons that others have given at length, that the 
causal theory of perception is correct – that S perceives x [...] if and only 
10 but if one denies perceptual realism (and the theory of success verbs), one can doubt 
the existence of the coach outside the window without also doubting that somebody is 
hearing such a coach (and not only has an auditory experience, which seems to come 
from a coach outside the window).
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if an experience of its seeming (epistemically) to S that x is present is 
caused by x’s being present. So S has an experience of God if and only 
if its seeming to him that God is present is in fact caused by God being 
present. (p. 296)
The causal theory of perception that Swinburne adopts in this passage 
concerns more than the mere description of an experience; for this is 
a theory about how real objects bring about perceptions, to wit, causally. 
This causal aspect of the theory has severe problems of its own. We will 
not confront them here.
Pertaining to the description of experience and in order to elicit the 
difficulties in Swinburne’s account that arise from such descriptions, 
we first have to look at a distinction that Swinburne himself, following 
Chisholm, calls ‘crucial’ (p. 294): the distinction ‘between the epistemic 
and the comparative uses of such verbs as ‘seems’, ‘appears’, ‘looks’ etc.’ 
(pp. 294 f.). As already pointed out in the beginning, it is important to 
understand that this distinction is a  distinction within or for internal 
descriptions. People give internal descriptions of their experiences, and 
they do so by means of terms like ‘appear’ or ‘seem’ as well as by perception-
verbs such as ‘look’, ‘feel’, or ‘taste’. of all these terms – Chisholm calls 
them ‘appear words’ – there can be an epistemic and a comparative use; 
but in any event, they are used in internal descriptions.
Now according to Swinburne’s account, internal descriptions are 
internal because they describe only the experience itself without implying 
anything about the possible existence of the object that might have 
caused the experience; and there is no such implication, one would 
think, because a person that describes an experience internally expresses 
some doubt about the possible existence of that object. For example, if 
I have an experience and describe it with (2), then I might claim that 
I have an auditory sensation that seems to come from a coach outside the 
window, but it just seems that way; maybe there is a coach, maybe not. 
According to Swinburne, in sentences like (2), the term ‘seem’ is used 
epistemically: ‘To use such words in their epistemic use is to describe 
what the subject is inclined to believe on the basis of his present sensory 
experience’ (p. 295). When uttering (2), I do not claim that there is in fact 
a coach outside the window. I only claim to have an auditory experience 
that seems to come from a coach outside the window. However, when 
using the term ‘seem’ epistemically like in (2), I  want to express my 
inclination to believe that this auditory experience probably has its cause 
184 GreGor NICKel & DIeTer SCHÖNeCKer
in a coach outside the window. I am uncertain of its cause; for if I were 
certain, I would simply give an external description and utter (1). but 
since I am only ‘inclined to believe’ (p. 295, emphasis added) that there is 
a coach outside the window, since I have only an ‘inclination’ (p. 295) to 
this belief, I will describe my experience with (2).
It remains unclear precisely how much I am inclined to this belief in 
a coach outside in order to utter (2), or how probable I must think it that 
there is a  coach outside the window. Indeed, Swinburne says nothing 
about it. but I must find it more likely that there is a coach outside the 
window than not; but again, I must not be completely convinced of it, 
for otherwise my description would not be internal but external (or 
should be so), and I would use description (1). on the other hand, if 
I find it unlikely that there is a coach outside the window, or even if I’m 
quite positive that there is none, I’ll describe my experience internally 
by making a comparative use of ‘seem’, saying maybe (2), but meaning 
something like this:
(3) I hear something that sounds like a coach would normally sound 
outside the window.
by (3), I  am not saying that there is no coach outside the window. 
However, I must have serious doubts, believing that somehow it is rather 
unlikely that there really is a coach. If I did find it somewhat likely, or 
in other words if I were inclined to believe that there is a coach, then 
I  would probably utter (2). on Swinburne’s account, it is crucial to 
internal descriptions that they express a more or less strong doubt about 
the external object that might be perceived; this ‘more or less’ can further 
be differentiated and expressed by the epistemic and comparative use of 
those terms.
From this background-theory arises a  serious problem for 
Swinburne’s definition of ‘religious experience’. According to Swinburne, 
an experience that seems to a subject epistemically to be an experience 
of God must be an experience described internally; for only experiences 
described internally involve epistemic uses of appear words. This fits 
well with Swinburne’s early claim that ‘all arguments from religious 
experience must be phrased as arguments from experiences given 
internal descriptions’ (p. 294). An experience that seems (epistemically) 
to the subject to be an experience of God is an experience out of which, 
as already seen in the example of the coach above, arises an inclination 
to believe that God exists or is somehow present. Any description of 
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such an experience will be an internal description. Someone who makes 
a religious experience will describe it for instance like this:
(4) I have a visual sensation that seems to come from God.
Such a  person does not (strongly) believe that her sensation does, as 
a matter of fact, come from God; if she did, she would have no reason 
to utter a  sentence like (4) but rather would describe her experience 
externally. This has a  strange consequence: if someone, for instance, 
sees God (say in a  burning bush) and ‘on the basis of his present 
sensory experience’ (p. 295) forms the (strong) belief that she is in the 
presence of God, then, by Swinburne’s definition, this is not a religious 
experience, which means further that it is not an  experience that 
may serve as a  premise in the ‘argument from religious experience’. 
According to Swinburne, a religious experience is (as already quoted) 
defined ‘as an experience that just seems (epistemically) to the subject 
to be an experience of God’ (p. 295) such that the subject to some extent 
below certainty is just inclined to believe that God exists as the object 
of experience. So, according to Swinburne, people with true faith who 
believe to have a  religious experience in fact cannot have a  religious 
experience, since Swinburne includes the requirement of doubt into 
his definition of a religious experience. That seems odd to say the least 
and indeed too odd to be true and to be intended or even accepted by 
Swinburne.11
This consequence seems so absurd that we should look for another 
interpretation. In defence of Swinburne, one might come up with the 
following reply: Swinburne appeals to Chisholm’s distinction between 
the epistemic and the comparative use of appear words. Now Swinburne 
writes, ‘to use such words in their epistemic use is to describe what 
the subject is inclined to believe on the basis of his present sensory 
experience’ (p.  295, emphasis added). unfortunately, by emphasising 
the inclination to believe as part of an epistemic use of appear words,12 
Swinburne gives the impression that in an  internal description using 
appear words epistemically, some subject S expresses some doubt 
about the object allegedly perceived; Swinburne gives the impression 
that S, who describes her experience, will not have a firm belief in any 
11 on a conference at the university of Frankfurt (october 2009), Swinburne conceded 
that some of his definitions in this area might be a little ‘sloppy’.
12 In the crucial passage (p. 295) Swinburne talks about such an ‘inclination’ five times.
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event. but this impression, so the general defence, is misleading and 
unintended. Indeed, a quick look at Chisholm’s original text and theory 
shows that using an appear word does not rule out a strong belief at all. 
Says Chisholm:
If I say that the ship ‘appears to be moving’ [...] then it may be inferred that 
I believe, or that I am inclined to believe, that the ship is moving. When 
appear words are used in this way, then such locutions as ‘x appears to 
S to be so-and-so’ and ‘x appears so-and-so to S’ may be taken to imply 
that the subject believes, or is inclined to believe, that x is so-and-so.13
Thus, whereas Swinburne just writes that S has an inclination to believe 
something, e.g. that the ship is moving, Chisholm writes (twice) that 
S believes or is inclined to believe such a  thing. So we should read 
Swinburne while having in mind Chisholm’s thoughts. If someone makes 
an epistemic use of appear words in a sentence such as, for instance,
(5) God appears to be talking to me.
she is not necessarily expressing any doubt about what she believes; she 
might very well and strongly believe that God is talking to her. According 
to Chisholm, she could just as well have said
(5*) Apparently – or evidently – God is talking to me.
So the defence of Swinburne concludes with the following observation: it 
is a misinterpretation of Swinburne to assume that internal descriptions 
of experiences (including internal descriptions of religious experiences) 
making epistemic use of appear words express doubt.
unfortunately for Swinburne’s position, this defence is futile. 
To Chisholm the epistemic use of an  appear word is by no means 
an indication of some doubt on part of the subject. To use, for example, 
‘appear’ epistemically is just another way to express one’s perceptual 
belief. If S claims that it appears to her that the ship is moving (to pick 
up Chisholm’s example) she could just as well claim that she sees that 
the ship is moving (and hence that she believes that the ship is moving). 
In his chapter on the uses of appear words, Chisholm begins with 
a definition of ‘perceive’ in the propositional sense. In this definition he 
points out that a person who makes an epistemic use of an appear word 
can easily fulfil the conditions of actually perceiving the object that the 
13 Cp. Chisholm 1957: ch. 4, 43-53 (p. 43, emphasis added).
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person refers to – all that is required is that the person merely uses the 
appear word to describe her perception.
Assume that Swinburne’s account of internal descriptions is along 
the lines of Chisholm’s own account. Then Swinburne faces another 
difficulty. The reason why Swinburne introduces a distinction between 
external and internal descriptions in the first place is that he wants to 
avoid a blatant petitio principii in the argument from religious experience. 
Such an argument would run as follows:
1. Joe sees Poseidon standing by the window.
2. Whenever a person sees x, x really exists.
Therefore, Poseidon really exists (and is standing by the window).
The problem with this, says Swinburne, is ‘that there is going to be 
considerable doubt about the truth of the [first] premiss’ (p. 294). The 
first premise can only be true if Poseidon really exists; for Poseidon’s 
existence is the requirement that makes it possible for Joe to really see 
Poseidon standing by the window. What is to be proved (Poseidon’s 
existence), is already presupposed in the first premise (whereas the truth 
of the second premise does not depend on the success-character of the 
term ‘seeing’, but on the ‘principle of credulity’). To avoid this problem, 
Swinburne suggests to use only internal descriptions because these 
descriptions, again, do ‘not entail the existence of anything external’ 
(p. 294, emphasis added); rather, they report only an experience and they 
report it epistemically.
So on Swinburne’s own account Joe does not, properly speaking, 
believe at all that Poseidon is standing by the window (and, therefore, 
exists); he just has an inclination to believe so. If, on the other hand, one 
assumes (generously and against what Swinburne says) that Swinburne’s 
account of internal and external is not different from Chisholm’s original 
account, then Swinburne is unable to avoid a  circularity he pointed 
out himself, a circularity that led him to avoid external descriptions of 
experience for an argument from religious experience in the first place.
To sum up shortly, Swinburne is confronted with the following 
dilemma: either the perception verbs that are used to describe religious 
experiences are used externally, which means using them as achievement 
verbs – but then it follows that the argument from religious experience 
is circular. Or, as Swinburne suggests, perception verbs used to describe 
religious experiences are used as epistemically internal descriptions – but 
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then the person who uses them cannot believe as strong as one would 
suppose someone to believe who has a religious experience.
These problems are not least generated, we believe, by the fact that 
Swinburne does not discriminate between the first and third-person-
perspective. We already hinted to Swinburne’s emphasis of the fact that 
in an argument from religious experience descriptions are involved, i.e. 
internal descriptions (as opposed to external descriptions). but whose 
descriptions are these? Given the way Swinburne introduces internal 
and external descriptions, it is strongly suggested that the subject that 
makes the experience describes this experience herself. In any event, in 
the examples that Swinburne provides it is the subject herself that speaks: 
‘If I really do hear the coach outside the window’, or: ‘Yet, if I describe 
my experience as ... ’, or: ‘I talked to God last night’, or: ‘I saw Poseidon 
standing by the window’ (all p. 294, there are more examples). Now if 
we as philosophers of religion take such a first-person-description as the 
premiss of an argument from religious experience, we are faced with the 
problem that we either beg the question by having to take perception 
verbs as achievement verbs in the context of an  external description, 
or we run into the problem of only being able to acknowledge those 
experiences with dubitable objects as ‘religious experiences’. but why 
make things so complicated? of course, unless we make religious 
experiences of our own, we will have to start with what someone reports 
and describes. What Joe reports is that he saw Poseidon standing by the 
window. but then all we have to do is to change to the third-person-
perspective. Thus, taking into consideration Swinburne’s goal of prima 
facie justification,14 the above argument from religious experience would 
get the following form:
1. Joe has an experience that he describes as seeing Poseidon standing 
by the window.
2. Whenever a person has an experience that he or she describes as 
seeing some external x, then he or she is prima facie justified in 
believing that x really exists.
Therefore, Joe is prima facie justified in believing that Poseidon really 
exists.
14 It is a different matter that this kind of prima facie justification does not help much 
within the apologetic debate. At least, a clearer formulation of the argument shows more 
precisely where the difficulties lie – e.g. in the missing persuasiveness of experiences had 
by only a few to those not having had the same experiences.
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This concludes the discussion of the first problem.15 Now let us turn to 
more serious problems such as the second. The question is: ‘What makes 
an experience an experience?’
15 The most simple solution to Swinburne’s problems would probably be to give up 
the theory of success verbs; but this is not what we want to discuss here. We think that 
there are cases in which there are good reasons to say that someone hears something 
that does not exist. Such cases, if they exist, prove that ‘hearing’ is not a  success verb 
and, a forteriori, that ‘perceiving’ is no success verb. Think about what it really means 
to state that a verb like ‘hearing’ (to take it as an example) is a success verb. It means: 
The speakers of a certain (english-speaking) language community which make use of 
the verb ‘hearing’, use it de facto as a success verb; it should not be used differently; this 
is an  implicit rule within the community and the speakers accept that rule or would 
accept it, after having become clear about it. The theory that hearing is a success verb is, 
in fact, not (part of) an attempt to give a definition of that verb which neglects common 
speech. However, it is also possible to show that even philosophers who take perception 
verbs to be success verbs do not always comply to using them according to their theory. 
richard Schantz, for example, writes in an essay on the plasticity of perception (2000: 
66), where he is discussing the phenomenon of phoneme restoration: ‘In these cases, 
a person hears a recording of a word, from which a phoneme was removed and replaced 
by a click-sound. Though she knows about the manipulation, she hears the whole word.’ 
It is remarkable that Schantz writes that the subject hears a recording of the word which 
is missing a phoneme and that the subject, even if she knows about the phonemic gap, 
‘hears’ the whole word. How could that be possible if ‘hearing’ was a  success verb? If 
‘hearing’ would be a success verb, one could only hear what is in fact present in form of 
an acoustic signal. Suppose, the word uttered is ‘eiseClICKbahn’. The subject could not 
hear ‘eisenbahn’, since the word ‘eisenbahn’ would not have been uttered and one cannot 
hear what has not been uttered. Since we (and also Schantz), in fact say (and want to 
continue saying) that the subject hears ‘eisenbahn’, ‘hearing’ cannot be an success verb. 
In conversation, Schantz objected to our argument as follows: If somebody sees a table 
whose surface is mostly covered by a  tablecloth, we still say that the person sees the 
(whole) table, though she does not see it completely. However, this analogy is flawed, since 
in the example of the table, the table is present as a whole and is only partly perceived. 
In contrast, the acoustic sequence of the word ‘eisenbahn’ is not present; therefore, it is 
not as if the word was completely there but only partially (since covered by a ClICK) 
perceived. The word is not there (is not uttered, does not exist) and, therefore, could not 
be heard if ‘hearing’ was a success verb. but we say that the subject hears it. Therefore, 
‘hearing’ is no success verb. but why is it then, that Schantz says that the subject ‘hears’ 
the whole word, even if the word has not been uttered? And why is it, that we are used to 
speak that way and do not want to change our way of speaking? The reason may be that 
the verb ‘hearing’ refers to what is subjectively given to the perceiving subject, something 
that does not change, regardless whether what causes it exists or not. but then should we 
not also say that even hallucinating people hear something that is not there? The reason 
why we do not want to say that a hallucinating person ‘hears’ something could be that we 
assume the cognitive apparatus of hallucinating people to be deficient, which is not the 
case for the subject in Schantz’s example.
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II. THe SeCoND Problem: 
WHAT mAKeS AN eXPerIeNCe AN eXPerIeNCe?
As already noted, Swinburne begins with a  very broad definition of 
‘experience’: ‘An experience is a conscious mental event’ (p. 293). later 
upon moving to the concept of religious experience, Swinburne appears 
to identify the act of experiencing God with being aware of God. Says 
Swinburne: ‘What is it for the subject to be right, in fact to experience 
God, that is, to be aware of God, and in a very general sense to perceive 
God ... ’ (p.  296, emphasis added); then again, Swinburne identifies 
perception with awareness: ‘“Perceive” is the general verb for awareness 
of something apart from oneself ’ (p. 296).
To begin with a minor note, the latter definition is certainly misleading: 
That ‘experience’ is the experience ‘of some particular external thing apart 
from the subject’ (p. 292, emphasis added) and, accordingly, that ‘perceive’ 
is the ‘general verb for awareness of something apart from oneself’ cannot 
be taken literally; for there is, of course, inner perception too, e.g. when 
it comes to pain, where we perceive something that is not ‘apart from 
the subject’. of course, Swinburne is aware of this problem, so that one 
should ask why he presents this rather strict definition of perception. The 
answer could be that Swinburne wants religious experience (or religious 
perception, if veridical) not to be a kind of perception of inner objects or 
states, but a kind of perception of God.16 However, it would surely have 
made more sense to distinguish between inner and outer perception; this 
would have allowed Swinburne to point out more clearly what makes 
a perception, inner or outer, a perception at all.
To claim that experience is a conscious mental event is certainly true; 
but recognising this is unenlightening because this very same predicate – 
to be a conscious mental event – applies, of course, to quite different things 
such as thinking, perceiving, feeling, memorising, introspection, and 
maybe some more. All these are mental events, but not experiences. our 
concern is simple but crucial: Swinburne provides no account whatsoever 
of what makes a conscious mental event an experience. Although he offers 
a necessary condition for something to be an experience (a conscious 
mental event), this condition is obviously not sufficient. To have thoughts 
about God is a  conscious mental event too; if we are to distinguish 
16 Cp. footnote 2 on p. 295, where Swinburne explicitly speaks of religious or quasi-
religious experiences (e.g., in buddhist tradition), which are not experiences ‘of anything 
external’ and which he wants to exclude.
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thoughts about God from experiencing God, we need to know more 
than just that the latter is a conscious mental event. The experience of 
God must be understood as a  source of knowledge about God that is 
different from possible other sources such as a priori knowledge, logical 
arguments, or thinking in general. This is not only a  narrow-minded 
remark on a minor definitional mistake that could easily be corrected. 
The weight of the ‘argument from religious experience’ essentially comes 
from the fact that the basis of this argument (i.e., religious experience) 
differs significantly from the basis of other arguments that Swinburne 
treats in previous chapters of his work.
on the one hand, one might think that what Swinburne has in mind 
when it comes to a  religious experience is something like a  religious 
perception, i.e. a  perception that involves sensations or common 
sensory experiences. Thus his first major example of an  experience is 
clearly about perception, the subject’s ‘hearing the coach outside the 
window’ (p. 294, emphasis added). on the other hand, an early example 
of a  religious experience  – ‘I  became conscious of a  timeless reality 
beyond myself ’ (p. 294) – is an experience not clearly, or in any event, 
not necessarily based on common perception. later on, Swinburne notes 
that this example belongs to one of five kinds of religious experience; 
and that this kind of religious experience is characterised by the fact that 
the experience is one ‘the subject does not have by having sensations’ 
(p. 300, emphasis added), which means that she has it without having 
sense impressions.17 With this kind of religious experience, it is ruled out 
that religious experiences are experiences as conscious mental events 
necessarily involving sensations; for here is an experience that a subject 
can have without any sensations (Swinburne refers primarily to ‘mystical’ 
experiences, p. 300). Swinburne claims that such an awareness is a kind 
of experience, but we learn nothing of what makes it an experience; we 
should not think of common experiences or perceptions here  – but 
of what else? What distinguishes a  religious experience of the fifth 
kind from the thoughts of Anselm, inventing and writing down the 
ontological argument, or from the experience of someone considering 
and reading it?
17 In this context (pp. 298 ff.), Swinburne also speaks of ‘visual sensations’ (p. 299) 
and ‘auditory sensations’ (p. 299), so he is obviously thinking of impressions mediated by 
our senses, which means (most prominently) impressions of our eyes or ears, or, shortly: 
sense-impressions.
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Finally, the possibility of having an  experience without sensations 
leads to a  further problem concerning the concept of internal 
descriptions. Swinburne defines ‘religious experience’, as we already 
quoted, as ‘an experience that seems (epistemically) to the subject to be 
an experience of God (either of him just being there, or of his saying 
or bringing about something) or of some other supernatural thing’ 
(p. 295). on the other hand, the epistemic use of appear words is defined 
as follows: ‘To use such words in their epistemic use is to describe 
what the subject is inclined to believe on the basis of his present sensory 
experience’ (p.  295, emphasis added). From this it follows, that any 
religious experience, since it always seems (epistemically) to the subject 
to be an experience of God, is an experience that brings about a belief, 
or in any event, an inclination to form or have a belief, ‘on the basis of 
present sensory experience’.
At the same time, Swinburne identifies the experience of God with 
the perception of God. Here ‘perception’, however, is defined in a way 
that does not entail that someone who perceives something does so ‘on 
the basis of present sensory experience’; ‘“Perceive”’, says Swinburne, ‘is 
the general verb for awareness of something apart from oneself, which 
may be mediated by any of the ordinary senses [...] or by none of these’ 
(p. 296, emphasis added). but if religious experience, that is, religious 
perception, may occur without the mediation of the senses, then these 
occurrences cannot be instances to be described with an epistemic use 
of ‘seeming’; for such an  experience is an  experience that makes the 
subject inclined to believe something ‘on the basis of his present sensory 
experience’, which obviously is not available if there is no mediation by 
the senses.
So either Swinburne gives up his broad understanding of ‘perception’ 
(that allows him to include non-sensory experiences), or he ought to 
alter his understanding of the epistemic use of appear words allowing 
an  epistemic use that is not based on sensory experience. As already 
mentioned, the fifth type of religious experience is introduced as one 
‘that the subject does not have by having sensations’ (p.  300). That is 
compatible with the wide use of ‘perception’ but it conflicts with the use 
of ‘seeming’ as part of what a religious experience is in the first place.
In summary, it is our opinion that Swinburne’s definition of experience 
is grained too coarsely, neither allowing him to describe religious 
experiences as religious experiences nor allowing him to distinguish them 
from other mental events that are also about religious objects. In order to 
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avoid leaving common speech (as well as philosophical tradition) too far 
aside, whoever is dealing with experience and perception on a theoretical 
basis should take the feature of givenness into account. especially when 
something is given to somebody not on the basis of sense experience (by 
one of our five or more senses), it seems reasonable to think of religious 
experience in terms of religious emotions. It is therefore worth noting that 
Swinburne has nothing to say on emotions – even when he speaks of a kind 
of religious experience that a ‘subject does not have by having sensations’. 
The basic problem we discussed so far – that Swinburne cannot explain 
what an experience is – will become even more problematic when we 
now turn to the third problem. For Swinburne also fails to explain what 
a religious experience is.
III. THe THIrD Problem: 
WHAT mAKeS AN eXPerIeNCe A relIGIouS eXPerIeNCe?
by definition, a  religious experience is ‘an  experience that seems 
(epistemically) to the subject to be an  experience of God or of some 
other supernatural being’. but what exactly does this mean?
let us take a  quick look at Swinburne’s classification of religious 
experience: there are five kinds of religious experience, Swinburne says 
(pp. 298-303); two of them are public, three are private. In the first kind 
of religious experiences, ordinary public objects such as a night sky are 
understood as supernatural objects.18 In the second kind, unusual public 
objects – such as a man looking and talking like Jesus in the comparative 
sense after crucifixion  – are taken to be religious objects, taken, for 
instance, to be Jesus. Here, it is important to note that Swinburne states 
that nonbelievers (non-religious people) will have the same sense-
impressions as believers – otherwise it would not be a public experience – 
but rather no religious experience at all: in his own words: ‘A  sceptic 
might have the same visual sensations (described comparatively) and yet 
not have the religious experience’ (p. 299). In the third kind of religious 
experience (which is the first kind of private religious experience), 
the experience of God is based upon ordinary sensations, or at least 
sensation that can be described in common terminology (one hears or 
sees God). Contrarily, in the fourth kind of religious experience there are 
18 ‘Thus someone may look at the night sky, and suddenly, “see it as” God’s handiwork.’ 
(p. 299)
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experiences accompanied by ordinary-sensations but not describable in 
‘normal vocabulary’ (p. 300). We have already mentioned the fifth kind 
of religious experience: it is a religious experience that is characterised 
by not having sense impressions while nevertheless having an experience 
of God.
Having introduced these five kinds of religious experience, 
Swinburne himself then raises the following question: ‘What was it 
about your experience that made it seem to you that you were having 
an experience of God?’ (p. 301). Clearly, the question drives at the object 
of the experience (‘What was it about your experience that made it 
seem to you that you were having an experience of God?’) and not at 
the way of referring to God (the question is not: ‘What was it about your 
experience that made it seem to you that you were having an experience 
of God?’). In any event, it is neither clear nor even discussed what makes 
an experience an experience of God, and this is because for the first four 
kinds of religious experience, Swinburne gives what he calls a  ‘partial 
answer’ (p. 301). The subject that has the experience has ‘such-and-such 
auditory or visual or other describable sensations’ (p.  301). However, 
with regard to the religious experiences of kind one, two and three, 
this answer is only partial, because according to Swinburne ‘the mere 
fact that one was having such-and-such sensations does not make the 
experience seem to be of God; someone else could have those sensations 
without thereby having a religious experience’ (p. 301, emphasis added). 
For instance, where a  believer sees the night sky as God’s handiwork, 
someone else just sees the night sky; where believers in the cathedral of 
Naples see the liquefaction of a sample of Saint Januarius’ blood, non-
believers just see some fluid.
Now if sensations of this sort as part of a religious experience are not 
what make an experience an experience of God, then what is it? by calling 
the answer partial, Swinburne suggests that sensations are necessary, 
but not sufficient. Since Swinburne says nothing about the other part of 
a possible full answer, the sufficient conditions for a religious experience, 
it remains mysterious what makes a religious experience an experience of 
God. It seems natural to argue that whatever makes such an experience 
an experience of God is based on the experiencing subject’s awareness of 
the existence of God. As stated elsewhere, Swinburne identifies these two 
things (‘What is it of the subject to be right, in fact to experience God, that 
is, to be aware of God, and in a very general sense to perceive God ... ’, 
p. 296, emphasis added). but ‘to be aware of God’ is not a  sufficiently 
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distinctive feature of religious experiences. mere thinking about God 
already means that the thinker is aware of (the existence of) God.
A subject might be aware of God in another way than by thinking, 
perhaps somehow related to sense impressions or analogous to 
perception. In reply to this idea one has to take into account that such 
sensory content might be present in a  strict sense (referring to sense 
impressions; cp.  the kinds of religious experiences 1-4), but that such 
content would not be religious in itself, since other subjects could 
have exactly the same sense impressions (‘might have had the same 
visual sensations’) too. Yet if sense impressions are not the distinctive 
features of religious experiences, then it remains obscure what indeed 
are the distinctive features of one’s experience that makes a  religious 
experience religious. emotional components of experience  – think 
of Schleiermacher’s famous ‘feeling of absolute dependence’  – could 
perhaps be entertained here as a possible distinctive feature; however, 
they just seem not to be important to Swinburne.
let us briefly consider one example. If it is possible that a  sceptic 
and Jesus’ disciples ‘had the same visual sensations (described 
comparatively)’ (p. 299) regarding the risen Jesus, then what makes the 
experience of the disciples a religious experience cannot simply be those 
visual sensations. Swinburne himself speaks of ‘the religious experience 
of taking the man to be the risen Jesus’ (p.  299, emphasis added); 
but taking something to be so-and-so is different from experiencing 
something as so-and-so. To take something as so-and-so is to interpret 
something as so-and-so, but an interpretation of one’s experience is not 
the experience itself. In defending the ‘principle of credulity’, Swinburne 
discusses Chisholm’s proposal to restrict the application of the principle 
to what Chisholm calls ‘sensible’ characteristics and relations, by which 
he means the ‘proper objects of sense’ (such as blue, soft, cold, etc.) and 
the ‘common sensibiles’ (such as being the same, right, left, etc.).19 So 
only an experience of sensible characteristics would be a real experience; 
anything else is an  interpretation of such experiences whereby one 
infers that something is the case. For example, one experiences that 
something is blue; one interprets that something is a  blue-dwarf-star. 
To use one of Swinburne’s examples: babylonian astronomers interpret 
their experiences of movements in the sky as holes in the firmament; 
Greek astronomers interpret them as the movements of physical bodies. 
19 Cp. Swinburne p. 307.
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Swinburne replies that one can perceive complex objects (one’s wife, 
a  Victorian table, a  blue-dwarf-star, etc.) without being able to back 
up the perceptual beliefs (e.g.: There walks my wife!) by beliefs about 
sensible characteristics.
Transferring this well-known problem to the current discussion, is 
there a sensory content of perception free from interpretation? As for the 
discussion about the perception of God, it is obvious what problems for 
the concept of such a perception arise. early on in his book, Swinburne 
defines God as ‘a person without a body (i.e. a spirit) who necessarily 
is eternal, perfectly free, omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good, and 
the creator of all things’ (p. 7). later on, he claims that God is ‘defined 
in terms of properties of which most of us have had experience. He is 
defined as a  ‘person’ without a  ‘body’ who is unlimited in his ‘power’, 
‘knowledge’, and ‘freedom’’ (pp. 306 f.). but these properties – person, 
power, knowledge, and so on – are clearly not perceivable by strength of 
our senses. rather, we interpret certain sensory impressions to be caused 
by a powerful, free, knowing, etc. person. In any event, Swinburne either 
needs to argue that ‘Godness’ is perceivable like one of the sensible 
characteristics  – like blue or soft  – or that it is analogous to complex 
properties like tea-smelling or blue-dwarf-stars. either way seems to be 
a dead-end.
IV. SummArY AND FuTure ProSPeCTS
In summary, it should have become clear that the attempt to construct 
an ‘argument from religious experience’ already failed at the beginning 
due to an  insufficient definition of the term ‘religious experience’. The 
first difficulty, we noted, is mainly terminological; that those experiences 
accompanied by an inclination to believe and described externally are, 
by Swinburne’s own definition, not religious experiences. This difficulty 
could be resolved by either explicitly referring to the experiencing 
subject’s perspective or giving up the theory of success-verbs.
The other problems are more serious. They show that Swinburne has 
neither a  clear and adequate concept of experience, nor can he point 
out the characteristic features of religious experiences. It is remarkable 
that a follower of analytical philosophy of religion, a philosophy which 
generally stresses the importance of precise terminology (as Swinburne 
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himself does), allows for such inaccuracy20 in his terminology. 
Furthermore, there has even been a  long substantive debate on the 
argument in which the problems we noted have never been discussed.
A reason might be that Swinburne (in contrast to Alston) seems not to 
be very interested in a precise phenomenology of religious experiences. 
In particular, there is no precise exegesis (for example) of biblical reports 
of experiences of God. The story of the burning bush, the narrative of 
emmaus or the easter narratives all describe rather sensitive experiences 
that surely are not grasped in their full complexity when – analogous to 
Swinburne’s example – merely understood as a ‘perception of objects’.
Another reason can probably be found in a conflict of goals: on the 
one hand, the persuasiveness of sense perception should be transferred 
to religious perception; but that means leaving out from the concept of 
religious experience everything that looks like a religious interpretation 
of usual or unusual events or like a religious emotion coming along with 
such experiences. on the other hand, the experiences mentioned here 
(which Swinburne never describes precisely) are rare, unusual or even 
non-sensory experiences that are precisely not analogous to ordinary 
sense-perceptions. Furthermore, they are expected to carry the burden 
of proof for a  conclusion that has heavy implications for whoever 
accepts it. While the persuasiveness of reports of sense-experiences is, in 
principle, based on the possibility to verify the reported observation for 
oneself – sometimes after necessary preparations or training, as in the 
cases of Galileo and observations by telescope – this can hardly be done 
for religious experiences.
How far Swinburne extends the concept of experience becomes 
apparent in his reply to a critique which states that religious experience 
could be caused by something other than the religious object that 
the witnesses report to have experienced. To this common critique 
(mentioned already in the New Testament, Acts 2:13: ‘They [the disciples] 
are filled with new wine’ or as projection-theory in the classical critique 
of religion), Swinburne replies by pointing out that God is the cause of 
all thoughts and events and, therefore, that every experience, especially 
every religious experience, is caused by God.21 If that is true, the claim 
‘I have an experience which is caused by God’ cannot be false. but the 
20 on a  side note, Swinburne’s excessive use of mathematical probability theory is 
rather pretending precision than demonstrating it; cp. also Nickel 2011.
21 Cp. Swinburne, p. 320.
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question if it is true at all, should be answered by referring to religious 
experiences; it follows that such an argument would be immune to all 
critique.
besides, there has never been de facto a  sceptic who has been 
convinced by reports of religious experiences (consider, for example, 
doubting Thomas). much less convincing would even be an argument 
based on those reports, as Swinburne has to offer. If we are to avoid 
suggesting that the collapse of the whole argumentation is due to the 
argument itself, then the group of doubters would have to be disqualified 
as being irrational and deluded. both alternatives seem to be neither 
rational nor Christian.
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